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Channel: CVE-2024-3094: Malicious code in xz 5.6.0 and 5.6.1 tarballs
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CVE-2024-3094: Malicious code in xz 5.6.0 and 5.6.1 tarballs

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Yes. My point is that we don’t need to update the xz binary that is used in stdenv (or at least not right away), if we ensure that it’s only used during isolated builds. Even if the xz binary is technically using the “vulnerable” liblzma library, it doesn’t really matter since it can extract .tar.xz files just fine and the build process is isolated anyway.

We should have one version of stdenv.xz (and other build tools) that only exposes the binary, that is used only during stdenv builds (we might even want to enforce that it’s path doesn’t appear anywhere in build outputs) and another “nixpkgs-wide” version of xz that would be explicitly used by derivations that actually need xz (either to link to or to call the xz binary at runtime).

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